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Article

Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme
Court Justices to Dissent from the Bench?
Timothy R. Johnson†
Ryan C. Black‡
Eve M. Ringsmuth†‡
Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1988 Term Justice Harry
Blackmun was asked whether he believed Roe v. Wade1 would
be overturned. His outlook for the future of Roe was pessimistic: “The next question is, ‘[w]ill Roe v. Wade go down the
drain?’ . . . I think there’s a very distinct possibility that it will,
this term. You can count the votes.”2 When the Court added
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services3 to its docket Blackmun’s prediction seemed prescient. He was only partially right,
however; while the Court used Webster to enhance states’ ability to restrict abortions, it did not overrule Roe.4
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2008 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association.
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Copyright © 1999 by Timothy R. Johnson, Ryan C. Black and Eve M.
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1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Associated Press, Justice Fears for Roe Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1988, at A24.
3. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
4. Id. at 491–523.
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Certainly, Justice Blackmun was relieved that Roe survived another day, but the Court’s decision still troubled him
enough that he authored a dissenting opinion.5 To make his
reservations clear, when the Court’s decision was announced on
July 3, 1989, Blackmun took the relatively extraordinary step
of announcing an emotional dissent from the bench.6 For ten
minutes he spoke in a tone described as “grave, angry, and distressed.”7 Linda Greenhouse, the Supreme Court correspondent
for the New York Times, wrote the next day that Blackmun’s
tone was “weary and sorrowful.”8 This is perhaps because he
did not go into this dissent lightly. Rather, Blackmun seems to
have agonized over the perfect wording. Figure 1 depicts the
draft of his final three sentences—perhaps the most famous
words spoken in a dissent from the bench in the past twentyfive years.9

Figure 1: Blackmun’s Draft Dissent in Webster.

5. Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 490; EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 418–19 (1998).
7. LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 418.
8. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 5-4, Narrowing Roe v. Wade,
Upholds Sharp State Limits on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1989, at A1.
9. Harry Blackmun, Insert C (date unknown) (unpublished draft dissent
to Roe v. Wade, on file with the Library of Congress) (Figure 1).
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There are two notable features of Blackmun’s conclusions.
First, he added the word “for” at the beginning of the first two
sentences to emphasize that, in his eyes, Roe’s days were clearly numbered. Second, he indicated the precedent’s demise
would be harsh, and he looked for the right words to make his
point. Originally he typed, “Oh, but an icy wind blows.”10 However, he inserted changes below the text that were ultimately
what he proclaimed: “But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows.”11 As he gave this dissent from the
bench Blackmun certainly appears to have been cognizant that
his words would have a clear effect on the public’s view of Webster. As such, his dismay was publicly evident.
Using Blackmun’s behavior as a launching point, this Article argues he read his dissent because of his ideological discord with the majority, because of the legal and policy salience
of the Court’s decision, and because of his concern that Roe
would soon be overturned. The question is whether Blackmun’s
behavior was specific to Webster or whether there is something
systematic about his behavior across Justices, across Courts,
and across time. In other words, are there empirical regularities to the conditions under which Justices will announce their
separate opinions from the bench or, alternatively, is it simply
a random phenomenon?
The answer, laid out in the remainder of this Article, is
that important and theoretically motivated patterns exist to
explain Justices’ decisions to announce separate opinions from
the bench. The empirical results demonstrate the decision to
announce is a function of ideological, case-specific, and potentially strategic considerations. The remainder of this Article
proceeds as follows. Part I explores additional examples of publicly read dissents. Part II puts forth the theoretical argument
and provides hypotheses based on this argument. Part III describes the data used to test these hypotheses, and Part IV
presents the results of this analysis. This Article concludes
with a discussion of whether announcing dissents from the
bench can have an effect on legal policy and what these find10. Id.
11. Id. At least one citizen was unhappy with Blackmun’s public argument. Indeed, on July 6, 1989, Gerald Foley wrote to the Justice. His letter
was one sentence long: “Mr. Justice Blackmun: Concentrate on rendering decisions and leave the weather reports to the meteorologists. Thank You.” To
this, Blackmun wrote on the bottom of the note, “a chill wind blows!” Letter
from Gerald Foley to Harry Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
(July 7, 1989) (on file with the Library of Congress and with the author).
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ings mean for our understanding of Supreme Court decision
making and the Justices’ relationships with one another.
I. READING SEPARATE OPINIONS FROM THE BENCH
Justice Blackmun’s public dissent in Webster is certainly
interesting but is not unique; many other examples—some
tempered, some terse, some extremely long, and some that pull
no punches—demonstrate the importance of this behavior. This
Part discusses some of the most famous of these phenomena
from the twentieth century.
When he took over the Chief Justiceship in 2005 John Roberts hoped to achieve some measure of collegiality on a Court
that had become increasingly divided since 2000.12 Initially, the
Justices’ propensity for consensus suggested Roberts might
have been successful.13 Towards the end of the 2005 Term and
into the start of the 2006 Term, however, his hopes began to
unravel.14 In fact, more than one-third of all cases decided during the 2006 Term came down to a 5-4 vote—a modern record.15
The reading of dissents from the bench demonstrates disharmony on the Court—at least over the outcome of specific cases.
In fact, the liberal wing of the Roberts Court appeared to become increasingly upset with their colleagues’ decisions. As
such, each Justice in this typical voting bloc read dissents from
the bench during the 2006 Term.16
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,17 Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg announced her dissent from the bench, the
second time in two months she took such a tack in cases involving women’s rights.18 While it was clear that the actions of her
12. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 104,
105.
13. Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Dissent Reveals Strain Beneath Court’s
Placid Surface, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at A1.
14. See id.; Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court’s Helm, but He Isn’t Yet
in Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at A1.
15. See Anthony Lewis, The Court: How ‘So Few Have So Quickly
Changed So Much,’ N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 20, 2007, at 58, 58.
16. Editorial, A Disappointing Term: President Bush’s Nominees Give the
Supreme Court an Activist Nudge to the Right, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, at
A14.
17. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
18. See Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A1. Ginsburg’s dissent was approximately seven minutes long. She began by strongly admonishing the majority coalition for its
decision: “In our view the Court does not comprehend or is indifferent to the
insidious way in which women can be victims of pay discrimination.” Audio
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colleagues angered Ginsburg, Robert Barnes writes that,
“Ginsburg’s voice was as precise and emotionless as if she were
reading a banking decision, but the words were stinging.”19 In
this public argument, she explicitly asked Congress to, “correct
this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”20 Justice Ginsburg announced an equally angry dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart.21
Richard Lazarus argues that announcing a dissent from
the bench is significant for a Justice; as he puts it, “[i]t’s a different order of magnitude of dissent.”22 For Justice Ginsburg,
Lazarus suggests her dissents “may be signifying an increasing
frustration [with the Court’s decisions].”23 One other notable
announced dissent from the liberal side of the Court came in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.24 In open court Justice Breyer argued that, “[i]t is
not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so
much.”25 Like Ginsburg’s dissents, Breyer’s indicates a clear
dissatisfaction with the direction of the Court’s legal policy
choices.
The reading of dissents from the bench on the Roberts
Court is not relegated to the moderate or liberal Justices, however. Indeed, during the 2005 Term Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas read angry dissents in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.26 As Tony Mauro and Jason McLure point out, “[f]or 30
minutes, spectators in the Court chamber saw a dramatic display of tensions between the moderate and conservative wings

recording: Opinion Announcement in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., Inc. (May 29, 2007), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/
2006/2006_05_1074/opinion/, at 4:00 min.
19. Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg’s Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits,
WASH. POST, May 30, 2007, at A1.
20. Audio recording, supra note 18, at 10:52 min.
21. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in
Gonzalez v. Carhart (Apr. 18, 2007), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/
2000-2009/2006/2006_05_380/opinion/, at 7:27 min.
22. Barnes, supra note 19.
23. Id.
24. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
25. Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (June 28, 2007), available at http://www
.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_908/opinion/, at 32:53 min.
26. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized in Boumediene
v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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of the Court.”27 Justice Thomas’s dissent began by noting that
he had never before taken such a tack: “In 15 terms on this
Court, I have never read a dissent from the Bench; but today’s
requires that I do so.”28 When it was Scalia’s turn, he made an
equally impassioned argument and closed by stating, “I vigorously dissent.”29
One year before Hamdan, Justice Scalia was equally caustic in his announced Roper v. Simmons dissent.30 Specifically,
he was angry when the Court ruled that the death penalty for
those who committed murder while under eighteen years of age
was cruel and unusual punishment.31 As Jan Crawford Green27. Tony Mauro & Jason McLure, Top Court Invalidates Gitmo Tribunals,
N.J. L.J., July 3, 2006, at 11, 11.
28. Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
(June 29, 2006), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_
05_184/opinion/, at 24:26 min. Thomas continued:
A mere ten days ago, each member of today’s plurality deferred to
the Army Corps of Engineers’ highly questionable determination that
storm drains, roadside ditches, and desert washes are navigable waters or, rather, waters of the United States. Today, when there is
much more at stake than ephemeral pools of water, the plurality and
the Court repeatedly refuse to defer to the wartime judgment of the
President himself. The Court's determination that it is qualified to
pass on the military necessity of the Commander in Chief ’s decision
to employ a particular form of force against our enemies is unprecedented, and it is unsupported by any authoritative source of law, and
is specifically refuted by every relevant historical example. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 24:36 min.
29. As Scalia put it:
Our past practice has always been to err on the side of caution
and deference to the Executive in cases involving the prosecution of
warfare and judgments about the appropriate use of military power,
including the power to try enemy captives. Today, that edifice of caution and deference comes crashing down. The Court takes on a new
role as active manager of the details of military conflicts. We bring
neither lawful jurisdiction nor competence to the performance of this
role. For all these reasons, I vigorously dissent.
Id. at 28:33 min.
30. 543 U.S. 551, 607 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. Justice Scalia’s announcement began angrily:
Today the Court announces that the meaning of the Constitution
has changed in the fifteen years since we decided [Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)], which held that the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit capital punishment for offenders who committed
crimes after the age of sixteen but under the age of eighteen. The
Court holds, mind you, not that our decision fifteen years ago was
wrong, but that our Constitution’s meaning has changed. It reaches
this implausible result by purporting to advert to [‘]the evolving standards of decency[’] of our national society. It finds that a national consensus that could not be perceived in our people’s laws barely fifteen

1566

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1560

burg noted, “Justice Scalia again forcefully and in quite harsh
language at times [said] that Justice Kennedy was making a
mockery of the Constitution, ignoring the wishes of the citizens
of the United States, and paying attention to the views of foreigners.”32
Certainly the Roberts Court has had its share of fireworks
when the Justices announce opinions, dissents, and concurrences in open Court. But other Courts, even those without the
ideological divisions of the recent years, have had equally interesting announcement days. Indeed, while Epstein et al.
demonstrate that, prior to roughly 1940, there was a norm by
which Justices did not publicly dissent either orally or in writing, such public displays occurred on occasion.33 For instance,
when the Court upheld a decision by President Franklin Roosevelt taking the country off the gold standard, Justice McReynolds declared from the bench that, “[t]he Constitution, as we
have known it, is gone.”34 Two years later McReynolds fired
another oral salvo when the Court upheld the social security
unemployment tax; specifically, he argued that the union of
states was being “destroyed.”35
Even after the practice of reading public dissents was
strongly discouraged by Chief Justice Burger, some Justices,
like Potter Stewart, continued the practice when deemed appropriate.36 In his tribute to Justice Stewart, Laurence Tribe
years ago now solidly exists. That is so, the Court says, because since
Stanford, four states have changed their laws to forbid execution of
under-eighteen offenders. Justice Kennedy said five states, one of
those five did not change its laws, a court changed the laws, a court
held that it was unconstitutional, in other words, if there is any
change in consensus it is the consensus of judges not of the people.
One wonders whether those four states would even have changed
their laws had they known that this Court, by a stroke of a pen, would
make the change irrevocable.
Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in Roper v. Simmons (Mar. 1,
2005), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_
633/opinion/, at 9:49 min.
32. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Juvenile Death Penalty (PBS television
broadcast Mar. 1, 2005), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/law/jan-june05/juvenile_3-1.html.
33. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 362–63 (2001).
34. See Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory
of Mr. Justice McReynolds (Mar. 31, 1948), in 334 U.S. v, x (1948).
35. See M’Reynolds Dies; Court Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1946, at
23.
36. See Laurence H. Tribe, Justice Stewart: A Tale of Two Portraits, 95
YALE L.J. 1328, 1331 (1986).
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argues that “[his] firm conviction that the republic deserves an
explanation of where its Supreme Court Justices stand on an
issue—and why— manifested itself in his policy of reading his
dissents from the bench.”37 Additional evidence of Stewart’s upfront approach in highly salient cases include his majority opinion in Katz v. United States38 (prior to the Burger Court) and
his concurrence in Furman v. Georgia39 (during the Burger
Court) in which the Justice’s avoidance of “turgid prose” was on
full display.40
Finally, timing affects opinion announcements as well.
Figure 2 shows a memorandum in which Justice Blackmun’s
clerk suggested that announcing his dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick41 on a Friday was a bad idea because it would be ignored during the weekend-long news cycle.42 Thus, she advised
him to push for the announcement to come down on the following Monday.43 The Chief Justice agreed to Justice Blackmun’s
request.44

37. Id.
38. 389 U.S. 347, 347–51 (1967) (“For the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”).
39. 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual.”).
40. Tribe, supra note 36.
41. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
42. Memorandum from Pamela Karlan, Law Clerk, to Harry Blackmun,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (June 24, 1986) (on file with the Library of
Congress) (Figure 2).
43. Id.
44. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186 (noting that the case was decided on
Monday, June 30, 1986). Although focusing on the timing of announcements
may stem from political astuteness, reading a dissent from the bench can come
at bad times as well—sometimes in very tragic ways. Indeed, former Chief
Justice Rehnquist points out that on April 22, 1946, while announcing a dissent from the bench, Chief Justice Stone pitched forward, felled by a stroke,
and died later that night. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks at Duke University School of Law, as part of the My
Life in the Law Series (Apr. 13, 2002), available at http://www.supremecourtus
.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04 -13-02.html.
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Figure 2: Memo Concerning Timing of Opinion Announcement in Bowers.

II. WHAT EXPLAINS ANNOUNCED DISSENTS
FROM THE BENCH?
The Introduction and the previous Part indicate that Justices can and do announce separate opinions from the bench—
even when Court norms suggest taking such action should be
rare. Why would Justices ever take such a tack? Because scholars have not written specifically on the decision to orally dissent, this Article turns to analyses of other behaviors for clues
as to why they would engage in this behavior. This Part considers the most relevant of this small but rich literature, with a
clear focus on dissenting behavior more generally.
Announcing a dissent or concurrence orally is not the only
means by which Justices can “go public” when they are dissatisfied with decisions their colleagues make (at any stage of the
decision-making process). For example, when a Justice publishes a dissent from the denial of certiorari, she publicly expresses her disapproval of the Court’s decision not to review a
case—an action that is not taken lightly.45 These dissents may
play two separate, but equally important roles. First, they provide an avenue through which a Justice may communicate with
external actors.46 Indeed, Justices may wish to comment on a
lower court’s decision or to relay information to litigants regarding strategies for getting similar cases accepted in the future. Second, a dissent from denial may be part of the Court’s
45. See Tribe, supra note 36, at 1330–31.
46. Lee Epstein et al., Discerning the Goals of U.S. Supreme Court Justices (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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internal bargaining process.47 That is, a Justice may use such a
dissent to indicate her resolve on a matter or to boost the credibility of future threats to go public. Regardless of the intended
audience, going public through dissents from denial of certiorari serves key purposes for the Justices. At the same time, however, doing so also breaks a norm of behavior on the Court.48
A particularly poignant example is that sometimes Justices
even threaten to publicly discuss internal Court procedures
with which they disagree. Justice Douglas’s reaction to Chief
Justice Burger’s request for reargument in Roe v. Wade illustrates this point.49 When Burger asked for this course of action, Douglas was incensed and threatened to make public a
dissent that told “what is happening to us and the tragedy it
entails.”50 He was particularly upset because the Court had a
majority and he believed the Chief wanted to hear rearguments
in part to procure the votes of Justices Powell and Rehnquist—
the two newest members of the Court.51 Thus, Douglas felt the
Chief’s plan “dilute[d] the integrity of the Court and ma[de] the
decisions here depend on the manipulative skills of [the] Chief
Justice.”52 Ultimately, we believe announcing opinions from the
bench is similar to Justice Douglas’s behavior in Roe and to the
decision to dissent from denial of certiorari. That is, each behavior breaks a collegial norm on the Court, and is therefore not
taken lightly by the Justices choosing such a course of action.
The remainder of this Part focuses on the literature on dissenting behavior to provide us with insight into announced opinions; these insights are presented as a series of hypotheses.
Scholars provide three primary explanations for this behavior: ideological affinity, strategic factors, and institutional context.53 First, and most fundamentally, the decision to dissent or
concur stems from a disagreement over law and policy preferences.54 This may be because a Justice is unhappy with the
precedent set in a case, or because she believes existing legal
47. Id.
48. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 59 (1998).
49. LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 354.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. For a discussion of when the Court is likely to hear rearguments,
see Valerie Hoekstra & Timothy Johnson, Delaying Justice: The Supreme
Court’s Decision to Hear Rearguments, 56 POL. RES. Q. 351, 353–57 (2003).
53. E.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., The Politics of Dissents and Concurrences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 AM. POL. Q. 488, 494 (1999).
54. Id. at 494 –95.
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doctrine is being compromised by the majority’s policy choice.
Therefore, as Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman argue, a Justice is more likely to write separately when she is ideologically
distant from her colleagues. Furthermore, the likelihood of
ideological disagreement is increased by cases that deal with
multiple issues.55
Second, Wahlbeck et al. argue that the decision to write a
separate opinion is not simply a function of policy preferences.56
Rather, the decision may include a variety of strategic considerations.57 For instance, Justices must consider how the implications of their actions will affect long-term relationships with
their colleagues because the decision to write separately is affected by the collegial norms of the Court as well as by the relationship between each Justice and the majority opinion author.58 In addition to considerations of collegiality, the size of
the majority coalition may influence the decision to write separately.59 The strength of the majority’s coalition is related to its
size, and as such, a “minimum winning” coalition may be more
vulnerable to attack by members of the minority. Finally, separate opinions are more likely in highly salient cases because, in
these cases, Justices are less likely to sweep disagreements under the rug in the name of consensus or collegiality.60
Beyond Justices’ relationship with one another, they may
consider the reactions of external actors when deciding to read
a dissent from the bench. To support this argument, we draw
on Hausegger and Baum’s investigation of when Justices are
likely to offer invitations to Congress to override the Court’s
decision by passing new legislation.61 They find that such invi55. Id. at 495.
56. Id. at 496, 498.
57. Id. at 496–98. For a discussion of strategic choices more generally, see
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 48, at 56–98 (discussing whether Justices act
strategically to advance their legal interpretations); FORREST MALTZMAN ET
AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 62–72
(2000) (discussing the strategic methods that Justices use to influence their
colleagues during the opinion-drafting process); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 198–210 (1964) (discussing how a Justice may
use his power to further his policy objectives in the context of legal and political limitations). See generally Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Integrated
Models of Judicial Dissent, 55 J. POL. 914 (1993) (discussing the impact that
institutional rules and structures have on judicial voting).
58. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 496.
59. Id. at 497.
60. See id. at 496–97.
61. See Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action:
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tations may be more likely to occur in areas of minimal interest
to the Justices and in cases in which many amicus curiae briefs
were filed on the losing side.62 Their model focuses on invitations found in majority opinions; however, the effect of salience
may also operate in the opposite way. More specifically, Hausseger and Baum’s argument hinges on the fact that Justices
signing onto the majority opinion are requesting Congress to
take action on a decision with which they disagree.63 An issue
need not be of minimal interest when the minority expresses a
desire for congressional assistance in overturning the Court’s
decision because the minority Justices are actually requesting
Congress to overturn the decision made by the majority.
Beyond policy preferences and strategy, Justices’ decisions
may also be shaped by institutional factors such as holding the
Chief Justiceship, being a new member of the Court, and workload considerations.64 In other words, the institutional setting
in which Justices operate may encourage or discourage the
writing of a separate opinion. For example, while acclimating
themselves to their roles as Supreme Court Justices, new Justices may be less likely to author separate opinions than would
their more experienced counterparts.65
Ultimately, significant insight into why Justices may want
to announce a decision orally may be gleaned from their decision to dissent generally, and from the relationship between the
Court and external actors. These insights lead us to several
specific hypotheses that focus on both the Court’s internal and
external context. The Court’s internal dynamics are an important starting point to determine the effect that ideology plays in
a Justice’s decision to dissent from the bench. Given that we
know Justices are more likely to issue a written dissent when
they are ideologically distant from the majority opinion writer,66 Justices will also likely be influenced in the same way
when deciding whether to read the dissent in open court. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 162, 167–70 (1999).
62. Id. at 178–79.
63. See id. at 168.
64. See Brace & Hall, supra note 57, at 918–19; Wahlbeck et al., supra
note 53, at 498–99.
65. Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 498.
66. Id. at 495; see also Charles Cameron et al., Shaping Supreme Court
Policy Through Appointments: The Impact of a New Justice, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1820, 1834 (2009).
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Ideological Distance Hypothesis: The greater the ideological
distance between a Justice and the majority opinion author, the
more likely a Justice will announce a dissent from the bench.67
It is also known in the literature that Justices are less likely to write separately if they have cooperated more often with
the majority opinion writer in the past.68 This dynamic is also
likely involved in the decision to dissent from the bench. Specifically, Justices who have joined more opinions with the majority opinion author are less likely to publicly rebuke the policy
decision announced by the Court in the current case.69 This dynamic yields our second hypothesis:
Collegiality Hypothesis: A dissenting Justice is less likely
to publicly announce a dissent if she has cooperated with the
majority opinion author more often in the past.
Next, when a case is particularly salient, the Justices’
views are more intensely held, which means that they are more
likely to hold fast to their policy positions stated at conference.70 As such, it is intuitive that Justices would be more
willing to air their differences in open court rather than simply
in written form. Thus, it is expected that:
Salient Case Hypothesis: Justices are more likely to announce dissents from the bench in politically and legally salient
cases.
The salience of a case may also be measured by how closely
divided the Justices are over the outcome of a case. Such divisions indicate a clear-cut disagreement over the policy set by
the majority.71 In other words, a Justice may be more upset
about a majority decision in these cases than when the Justices
reach a unanimous or near unanimous decision. This leads to
the hypothesis that:
Minimum Winning Coalition Hypothesis: A Justice is more
likely to announce a dissent from the bench when the majority
coalition is minimum winning, as in a 5-4 decision.
Beyond factors internal to the Court, external forces may
influence the decision to announce from the bench. Indeed,
67. Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 495.
68. Id. at 496, 500, 502–03.
69. See id. at 496, 507. Wahlbeck and his colleagues specifically argue
that the more often the present majority-opinion writer has cooperated with a
Justice in the past, the less likely the Justice will author a separate opinion in
the present case. Id. at 502–03, 507.
70. See id. at 496–97.
71. See id. at 497, 503.
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Hausseger and Baum argue that Justices may sometimes try to
send signals to the elected branches about changing decisions
with which they disagree.72 We utilize this intuition and argue
that Justices dissatisfied with a decision may announce a dissent in open court as a strong signal that Congress should alter
the majority opinion. In particular, we hypothesize that:
Distance from Congress Hypothesis: The closer ideologically
a Justice is to each house of Congress, the more likely he will
read a dissent or concurrence from the bench.
III. DATA AND METHODS
To test our hypotheses, we use a newly constructed dataset
consisting of all cases that had, as of August 2007, an opinion
announcement audio file available on the Oyez website.73 These
announcement files, 1291 in total, cover cases decided between
1975 and 2006. There are some gaps and periods of undercoverage in the data. For example, between 1975 and 1984 data
are available for only twenty of the Court’s opinions. For cases
decided in the last fifteen or so Terms, the data are more complete. Of the 501 orally argued, signed opinions or judgments of
the Court released from 2000 to 2006, there are announcement
files for all but seven (or about ninety-nine percent of all cases).74
Because this Article focuses on modeling the decision of
each separate opinion author to announce his or her opinion in
open court, the unit of analysis is the separate opinion (excluding all non-unanimous cases). Across the 684 unique, nonunanimously decided cases, we observe a total of 1078 separate
opinions, forty of which (3.7 percent) were orally announced.
The dependent variable is coded 1 if a Justice announces either
a dissent or a concurrence in open court and 0 otherwise. Because this variable is dichotomous, the model invokes a logistic
regression with robust standard errors.75

72. See Hausegger & Baum, supra note 61, at 168.
73. For these announcements and many other resources, navigate
Oyez.com: U.S. Supreme Court Case Summaries, Oral Arguments & Multimedia, http://www.oyez.org/ (last visited April 14, 2009).
74. We are currently in the process of systematically examining what, if
any, biases exist in the sampling of cases that we have. Ultimately, however,
we are describing the population of currently available data. As more audio
files are made available, we plan to include them in our dataset.
75. We do not distinguish between concurrences and dissents. Of the separate announced decisions, however, only six of them are concurrences. Our
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The model includes a series of independent variables. First,
Majority Opinion Writer Distance measures the ideological distance between the majority opinion writer and the Justice who
writes separately in a case. We use the Judicial Common Space
(JCS)76 scores and calculate the absolute value of the difference
between the two Justices. This variable ranges from 0.0009 to
1.36 with a standard deviation of 0.378.
We also include a variable to test for whether Justices who
are more collegial with the majority opinion author are less
likely to read from the bench. To capture this concept we follow
Wahlbeck et al.77 and include Collegial Relationship, measured
as the percent of the time in the previous Term the separate
opinion author joined a concurring or dissenting opinion written by the majority author in the current case. This variable
ranges from 0 to 92.85 with a mean of 9.36.
To tap Case Salience, we include three variables. First, we
measure the Legal Salience of a case with a categorical variable
measured as 1 if a case formally alters precedent or declares an
act of Congress unconstitutional, and 0 otherwise.78 This variable takes on a value of 1 in approximately 10 percent of our observations.
Additionally, borrowing from social psychology literature,
Black and Johnson suggest that the more salient a case is to
the Justices, the more active they will be at oral arguments.79
Thus, to measure the degree to which individual Justices find a
case salient, we include the number of questions asked by the
Court during the case’s oral argument session. Number of
Oral Argument Questions has a mean of 128 and a standard
deviation of roughly forty-two questions.
Beyond these factors that focus on case salience, Hoekstra
and Johnson argue a proxy for case controversy is whether the
results do not change substantively if we omit them from the model. Thus, our
analysis largely focuses on the concept of dissenting from the bench.
76. See Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 303, 306–07 (2007).
77. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 500. The only difference between their measure and ours is that we do not purge this variable of “ideological compatibility.” Id.
78. This follows common practice in the literature. See, e.g., MALTZMAN ET
AL., supra note 57, at 46.
79. Ryan C. Black & Timothy R. Johnson, Judicial Politics and the Search
for the Holy Grail (of Salience) 10–11 (Jan. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/
2/1/2/4/6/pages212460/p212460-1.php.
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final merits vote was decided by a single vote.80 Accordingly, we
code Minimum Winning Vote as 1 for all cases with a minimum
winning coalition (for example, 5-4), and 0 for all other cases
(for example, 7-2). In our sample, thirty-nine percent of the observations are coded as 1.
To test the two congressional hypotheses, we return to the
JCS scores and compute the absolute value of the distance between the dissenting/concurring Justice and the median member of the Senate (Senate Median Distance) or the House
(House Median Distance). As we note above, we expect both variables to be negatively related to public announcements. That
is, when the Justice announcing hopes to be helped by Congress, she will make a public plea for the legislature to act.
Finally, we include three control variables that provide additional explanations for why Justices may announce dissents
or concurrences from the bench. We code Issue Expertise as the
number of separate opinions in a given value area written by a
Justice since joining the Court, divided by the total number of
cases from that value area that have come before the Court.81
We also include Freshman Separate Writer, which is coded 1 if
the Justice writing the separate opinion has not yet served two
full terms on the bench.82 Finally, Multiple Legal Provisions
comes directly from Professor Harold Spaeth and is coded as 1
when an opinion deals with more than one legal provision.
IV. RESULTS
We report the parameter estimates for our model in Table
1. Overall, the model performs relatively well and provides an
interesting glimpse of why Justices would take the unusual
step of announcing their dissents in open Court.

80. Hoekstra & Johnson, supra note 52, at 354, 356.
81. To operationalize this variable, we take an approach similar to
MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 43–44.
82. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 501. We also sought to control
for whether a Justice is the Chief. However, in the data no Chief Justice issued a dissent from the bench. Thus, it cannot be included in the model, but it
is suggestive that the Chief Justice, as leader of the Court, may be even more
reluctant than Associate Justices to break norms of collegiality. See, e.g., id. at
507.
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Variable
Coefficient
Robust Standard Error
Distance Between
1.62*
.79
Justice and Majority Opinion Writer
Collegiality Be0.03
.02
tween Justice and
Majority Opinion
Writer
Political Salience
0.01*
.00
for Justice
Legal Salience for
1.63*
.40
Justice
Minimum Winning
1.54*
.37
Majority Coalition
Distance Between Justice
-3.82*
2.02
and Senate Median
Distance Between Justice
2.99*
1.66
and House Median
Expertise of Justice in Is-0.00
.01
sue Area
Justice is New to the Court
0.03
.80
Case Complexity
-0.28
.49
Constant
-6.42*
.86
N
1078
Table 1: Logistic Regression Results of a Justice’s Decision to Announce a
Dissent from the Bench.
* Denotes p < 0.10 (two-tailed test).

Consistent with our Ideological Distance Hypothesis, the
data suggest that as the distance between the dissent author
and the majority opinion author increases, so too does the likelihood that the dissenter will orally announce her opinion. The
substantive magnitude of this result is visually illustrated in
Figure 3, which portrays the predicted probability of announcement, conditional on three levels of ideological distance.
When distance between the dissenting and majority writers is
at its minimum (in substantive terms the pairing of Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer in 2006), the predicted probability of an
announcement is 0.003.83 Moving to the median distance, or in
substantive terms the pairing of Justices O’Connor and Stevens
in 2000, the probability of observing an announcement increases to 0.007.84 While still miniscule in overall size, it is a 133
percent increase in the likelihood (and is statistically significant at the 90 percent level). Finally, moving to the maximum
83. See infra fig.3.
84. See infra fig.3.
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observed distance (pairing then-Associate Justice Rehnquist
with Justice Marshall in 1984), the probability of an announcement grows to 0.02, which is significant even though the
standard error bars overlap.85 This is still a small probability,
but given that Justices do not often dissent from the bench, this
is a large effect.

Figure 3: Effect of Majority Opinion Writer Distance on Probability of Announcement.

The data also lend limited support for the Case Salience
hypothesis. While the model suggests that all four variables are
significantly related to a Justice’s decision to announce her dissent—in probing each variable’s substantive significance—only
Number of Oral Argument Questions, which is displayed in
Figure 4, and Minimum Winning Vote have substantively mea85. See infra fig.3. The difference between the median and maximum is
not statistically significant, but the difference between the minimum and maximum is statistically significant at the ninety percent level.
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ningful results.

Figure 4: Effect of Number of Oral Argument Questions on Probability of Announcement.

Holding all other variables at their median values, a Justice has only 0.004 probability of announcing her opinion when
there is relatively little activity at oral arguments.86 For a case
with an average amount of oral argument activity, the probability doubles to 0.008.87 This difference is statistically significant at the 90 percent level. The move from an average case to
a case with an above average amount of activity increases the
probability of announcement to 0.01, but this change is not statistically distinguishable from either the mean or lower level of
oral argument activity.88
In the context of the Minimum Winning Vote variable, the
86. See supra fig.4.
87. See supra fig.4.
88. See supra fig.4.
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substantive results are stronger. Here, a Justice announces
with a probability of only 0.007 when the decision is not a minimum-winning one.89 In its minimum-winning counterpart,
however, a Justice will announce with a probability of 0.03—
more than a three-fold increase that is statistically significant
at the 90 percent level.90
Our model provides interesting yet mixed results for our
congressional hypotheses. Recall that we hypothesize that as
the distance between a Justice and the chamber median decreases, the Justice should be more likely to announce her separate opinion from the bench. The negative and statistically
significant coefficient on the Senate Median Distance variable
supports this intuition, but, paradoxically, the finding for the
House Median Distance variable runs contrary to our prediction. That is, while closeness increases the probability a Justice
announces her dissent when looking at the Senate median,
closeness decreases the probability that the same Justice announces when looking at the House median. Certainly, this is
not a fully satisfying result for us, but it is consistent with extant work that demonstrates that Justices are more likely to be
influenced by their ideological relationship with the Senate
than with the House.91
Finally, we do not find support for our Collegial Relationship variable,92 or any of the remaining control variables: Multiple Legal Provisions, Freshman Separate Writer, and Issue
Expertise.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court do not announce separate opinions from the bench often. However, they
do so under certain conditions. When a Justice is ideologically
89. See supra fig.4.
90. See supra fig.4.
91. Timothy R. Johnson, The Supreme Court, the Solicitor General, and
the Separation of Powers, 31 AM. POL. RES. 426, 438 (2003).
92. One might speculate that we have collinearity between our Collegial
Relationship and Majority Opinion Writer Distance variables. There is a medium-sized negative relationship between the two variables (p = -0.51), but
reestimating the model excluding Collegial Relationship does not affect our
inferences about Majority Opinion Writer Distance (p = 0.10), nor does estimating the model without Majority Opinion Writer Distance alter our inference about Collegial Relationship (p = 0.72). We retain both variables, as this
model specification makes the most sense both theoretically and statistically
(by the Bayesian Information Criterion).
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distant from the majority opinion writer, she is more likely to
issue a dissent in open court. In addition, when their ideological predilections are more strongly held (in salient cases), they
are more likely to speak out about a decision with which they
disagree. Finally, a Justice’s relationship with Congress affects
whether she will act in this manner. We believe these findings
tell us a good deal about how Justices interact with one another
and with their political context.
We also know that Justices who announce dissents use
tones that are also less pleasant and sadder than Justices who
announce majority opinions from the bench. This is an intuitive
finding, and is consistent with behavior exhibited by Justices
Blackmun, Scalia, and others. Indeed, when a Justice is particularly unhappy with what his colleagues in the majority have
done, and when a case is salient to that dissenting Justice, the
level of vitriol should rise.
The final question, however, is to what end Justices announce their dissents. Do they do so only to blow off steam, or
do they have another agenda? Hausseger and Baum demonstrate conditions under which majority coalitions will ask Congress to overturn a decision.93 However, they do not show evidence of whether Congress reacts to these invitations. While
our data do not allow us to systematically test this argument
either, cases in which announced dissents may have led to action by Congress do exist.94
For example, in Employment Division v. Smith the Court
held that a state law that prohibited the religious use of drugs
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.95 Congress responded with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, which required a compelling government interest for the enactment of laws that substantially
burdened religious freedom.96 Holding that Congress overstepped its enforcement powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court then invalidated the RFRA in
93. See Hausegger & Baum, supra note 61, at 167–70, 178–79.
94. See, e.g., Richard Leiby, A Signature with the First Lady’s Hand in It,
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2009, at C1 (explaining how Congress enacted the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act to overrule Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007)).
95. 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (stating that the state statute was a neutral, generally applicable law that did not violate other constitutional protections), superseded by statute 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (2000), as recognized
in United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1239 (D. Or. 1996).
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (2000).
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City of Boerne v. Flores.97 Congress then tried to fix the RFRA
through the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act.98 While we cannot draw a direct correlation between this
new law and her actions, Justice O’Connor announced her dissent in Boerne from the bench. The key to her decision came in
the conclusion of her five minute announcement: “[i]f the Court
were to correct the misinterpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause set forth in Smith, it would simultaneously put our
First Amendment jurisprudence back on course and would allay the legitimate concerns of a majority in Congress who believed that Smith improperly restricted religious liberty.”99 Our
argument is that her public statement had at least something
to do with why Congress passed such a law. As such, it is no
wonder that Justices continue to use such a strategy when they
think they will impact law and policy.
Our results lead to a more general conclusion: Justices will
read opinions from the bench when they care a good deal about
the issue and when they want to change the policy set by the
majority. That is, they use their dissents to signal litigants and
other actors (here we test the relationship with Congress) that
the decision is a bad one and someone must act to change it.
This is consistent with existing work and also adds to the concept that Justices act in calculated ways when rendering decisions.
Finally, announcing separate opinions from the bench offers Justices the ability to directly and publicly communicate
their positions, conveying additional information through the
manner in which they read these opinions.100 In the end, this
seems to be a rare, yet integral, part of how Justices decide
cases and how they interact with one another and those beyond
the Court.101
97. See 521 U.S. 507, 511, 516–17 (1997).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000).
99. Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in City of Boerne v. Flores
(June 25, 1997), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_
95_2074/opinion/, at 8:44 min.
100. Beyond explaining what factors lead a Justice to issue a dissent in
Court, we are interested in exploring what goes into such public statements.
That is, are all dissents as caustic and as morose as Justice Blackmun’s in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989)? See supra
text accompanying notes 5–10. We plan to investigate this topic in the future.
101. We note that our findings about signaling a Justice’s views are consistent with Guinier’s assessment of oral dissents as democracy-enhancing jurisprudence or demosprudence. See Lani Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47–56 (2008).

